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Abstract: This paper offers a historical appraisal of recent developments in the theory 
of very long run growth, focusing on two main areas: (1) linkages between wages, 
population and human capital and (2) interactions between institutions, markets and 
technology. Historians as well as economists have recently begun to break away from 
the traditional practice of using different methods to analyse the world before and 
after the industrial revolution. However, tensions remain between the theoretical and 
historical literatures, particularly over the unit of analysis (the world or particular 
countries) and the role of historical contingency. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a strong revival of interest in very long run growth amongst 
economists in the last decade or so, including unified growth theory (Galor and Weil, 
2000, Galor, 2005) and the economics of institutions (North, 1990; Greif, 2006). This 
paper examines these developments in theory, and assesses their significance for 
economic history. It is argued that economic historians have made parallel 
discoveries, with both theoretical and historical literatures sharing a refusal to 
recognise the traditional practice of using different methods to analyse the world 
before and after the industrial revolution. However, there are also tensions between 
the two literatures, with theorists often content to work with models where the unit of 
analysis is the world and an industrial revolution is inevitable. Historians, by contrast, 
tend to make use of cross-sectional variation, emphasising specific European and even 
British features of the industrial revolution, and allowing an important role for 
historical contingency.  
 
The paper begins with an examination of recent developments in two strands 
of the theoretical literature: (1) “unified growth theory” provides a new framework for 
modelling the transition from a Malthusian regime with a negative relationship 
between real wages and population to a modern growth regime with a positive 
relationship between these two variables, with a central role for human capital in 
bringing about both an industrial revolution and a demographic transition (Galor, 
2005). (2) New institutional economics has made progress in modelling the key role 
of institutions in solving the “fundamental problem of exchange” and creating an 
environment where economic growth is possible (North, 1990; Greif, 2006). In 
addition, Schumpeterian endogenous growth models have developed a framework for 
 3 
modelling the link between institutions and technology, via the patent system (Aghion 
and Howitt, 1998; Carlin and Soskice, 2006).  
 
There have also been important developments in the historical literature on 
very long run growth in the two areas outlined above: (1) In addition to the “Great 
Divergence” between Europe and Asia, economic historians have identified a “Little 
Divergence” within Europe between Britain and Holland on the one hand, and the rest 
of the continent on the other hand. Britain and Holland managed to maintain the real 
wage gains of the immediate post-Black Death period while limiting fertility and 
making a sustained investment in human capital. These countries also experienced 
growth of real GDP per capita during the late medieval and early modern period 
despite stagnation in the daily real wage, as a result of the “Industrious Revolution”. 
These developments suggest that it will be necessary to go back to the medieval 
period to fully understand the transition to modern economic growth (2) Institutions 
played an important role in the general economic development of late medieval and 
early modern Europe. Britain and Holland were the only two countries to succeed in 
overthrowing absolutist government during the early modern period. These two 
countries also played a leading role in the development of private order institutions, 
with growing commercialisation showing up in a dramatic decline in the share of the 
labour force engaged in agriculture and a sharp rise in the level of urbanisation. 
Interactions between institutions, markets and technology played an important role in 
the British overtaking of Holland, which marked the final stages of the transition to 
sustained modern economic growth. Innovation flourished in an environment where a 
patent system protected intellectual property, there was a large market, and factor 
prices provided an incentive to use machine-intensive methods.  
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This paper emphasises the common themes in these recent theoretical and 
historical developments. A concluding section nevertheless considers the difficulties 
of combining the two literatures. It is difficult to improve upon the perceptive 
comments of Schumpeter (1954: 815), who noted that “There are such things as 
historical and theoretical temperaments. That is to say, there are types of minds that 
take delight in all the colors of historical processes and of individual cultural patterns. 
There are other types that prefer a neat theorem to everything else. We have use for 
both. But they were not made to appreciate one another.” Schumpeter‟s words have 
particular force when applied to very long run growth, where historical narrative 
without theory can seem to lack direction, but where theory without attention to 
historical detail can all too easily result in over-simplistic generalisations. 
 
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY  
1. Wages, population and human capital in unified growth theory 
The most influential strand of the recent theoretical literature on very long run growth 
is unified growth theory, which seeks to explain the transformation from a Malthusian 
world with a negative relationship between population and per capita income to a 
Solowian world where population and per capita income can grow together (Hansen 
and Prescott, 2002). The Galor and Weil (2000) model has become the standard-
bearer of unified growth theory, and can be explained with a simple diagrammatic 
framework (Galor, 2005). The economy moves from a Malthusian regime (with a 
negative relationship between real wages and population) to a post-Malthusian regime 
(with a strongly positive relationship between real wages and population) before 
reaching a modern regime (with a weaker positive relationship between real wages 
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and population). Instead of separate regimes with the transition caused by a large 
shock, Galor and Weil see the escape from the Malthusian trap as a long dynamic 
process with long periods of gradual change leading eventually to phase transitions. In 
this respect, unified growth theory has something in common with historical 
researchers engaged in crossing the boundaries between medieval, early modern and 
modern economic history. 
 
In the Galor and Weil model, the development of the economy can be 
summarised using two key relationships, the education curve and the growth curve. 
The education curve captures the idea that technological progress (rather than the 
higher income it creates) raises the rate of return on human capital, so that education 
(e) is an increasing function of the growth rate of technology (g): 
)( 11 tt gee          (1) 
The growth curve captures the idea that a high level of education in turn generates a 
high rate of technological progress: 
 );(1 ttt Legg        (2) 
Note, however, that the growth curve is also affected by the size of the labour force 
and hence by the population size (L). This is the familiar scale effect of endogenous 
growth models. 
 
 The development of the economy can be characterised by three regimes, with 
different population sizes: small, moderate and large. The small population regime is 
illustrated by Figure 1A. With a small population, the only steady state equilibrium is 
with zero education and slow technical progress ),0(),(
lgge . In Figure 1B, with a 
moderate size population (L
m
), the growth curve has now shifted up to create the 
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possibility of multiple equilibria. The steady state equilibrium of zero education and a 
low rate of technological progress ),(),( lgoge  is locally stable, as is the 
equilibrium with a high level of education and a high growth rate ),(),( hh gege . 
There also exists an interior steady state ),(),( uu gege  which is unstable. In Figure 
1C, with a large population, the growth curve shifts up further, so that there is now a 
unique globally stable steady state equilibrium ),(),( hh gege  with high levels of 
education and technological progress. 
 
The intuition behind the model can be described as follows. The economy 
starts out in a Malthusian regime with a small population at the subsistence level of 
per capita income. There is no education and there is only very slow exogenous 
technological progress. In this world, population expands with technological progress 
in the standard Malthusian way. This follows from assumptions about preferences, 
with members of the current generation maximising the utility of their children as well 
as themselves. Over time, slow growth of the population under the Malthusian regime 
raises the rate of technological progress, shifting the growth curve upwards. This 
induces a shift into the moderate population regime, with multiple steady states. One 
equilibrium is the old Malthusian steady state with slow technological progress and 
zero education, but there is also a high education, high growth equilibrium. What 
happens to population growth depends on the balance of two effects. First, there is an 
income effect. As society gets richer, parents can afford to devote more resources to 
child rearing, and this increases population growth. But second, there is a substitution 
effect. Parents wish to give their children more education to cope with the 
technological progress, leading to a substitution of quality for quantity, because 
education requires resources. At first, the income effect dominates, as a previously 
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binding subsistence constraint is relaxed. This is the Post-Malthusian regime, 
characterised by an acceleration of both population and per capita income growth. 
However, in the long run, this effect from the relaxation of the subsistence constraint 
disappears and the substitution effect dominates. The economy then passes through a 
demographic transition and population growth slows down. This is the Modern 
regime. 
 
Note the importance of the scale effect in the Galor and Weil model, with 
population growth shifting up the growth curve in Figure 1 and bringing about an 
industrial revolution via an acceleration of technological progress. However, this 
makes it hard to understand the technological stagnation of large economies such as 
Mughal India or Qing Dynasty China. Indeed, in the run up to the British industrial 
revolution, China‟s population expanded from 100 million in 1685 to 300 million in 
1790 (Mokyr, 2005: 1148-1149). This issue is addressed by Jones (2001), who asks 
the question “was the industrial revolution inevitable?” Although he models the 
demographic transition in much the same way as Galor and Weil (2000), Jones (2001) 
dampens the feedback from population to technology. With a smaller scale effect, as 
in Jones (1995), institutional change is then required to bring about an acceleration in 
the rate of technological progress. The institutional change is modelled by Jones as an 
exogenous shift in the parameter π, defined as the share of consumption paid to 
compensate inventive effort. Without such a shock, the industrial revolution, by which 
Jones (2001: 32-33) means “the onset of rapid population growth and per capita 
growth culminating in the large increase in standards of living during the 20
th
 
century”, does not occur. However, institutions remain a black box in the Jones 
model, which is unfortunate given the large amount of effort devoted to understanding 
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institutions and institutional change in recent years, which will be considered in a later 
section. 
 
2. Unified evolutionary growth theory 
Before moving on to consider institutions, it is worth pausing to consider a recent 
development of unified growth theory, which uses an evolutionary approach, and 
avoids the need for the scale effect which was criticised in the previous section. The 
approach was pioneered by Galor and Moav (2002), and combines Darwinian 
elements with features of the basic Galor and Weil (2000) model outlined earlier. 
Individual preferences are defined over the quantity and “quality” of children, as well 
as over consumption above subsistence: 
 ]ln[lnln)1( 1
i
t
ii
t
i
t
i
t hncu     (3) 
where u is utility, c is consumption, h is the level of human capital, β reflects the 
preference of parents for quality, the superscript i indexes individuals and the 
subscript t indexes time. The population consists of two homogenous groups of type a 
and b, with the “quality types” attaching a higher preference parameter β than the 
“quantity types” (βa > βb). Figure 2A shows how technological progress affects the 
choice of investment in quality for both types of individual. Investment in quality 
increases with the rate of technological progress because of the increased demand for 
skilled labour. Galor and Moav assume that as the rate of technological progress (g) 
increases, the share of quantity types (q) at first declines, but then increases, which 
introduces a non-convexity to the education curve. 
 
In Figures 2B and 2C, the Galor-Moav model behaves in a similar way to the 
Galor-Weil model. However, note that the axes have been reversed and it is now the 
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education curve rather than the growth curve which shifts over time. In Figure 2B, the 
position of the education curve is pinned down by the small share of quality types in 
the population. In this Malthusian era, in the absence of large shocks, the economy 
remains stuck in a locally stable equilibrium with a low rate of technological progress 
and a low level of education (g
L
, e
L
). The equilibrium (g
U
, e
U
) is unstable. The 
Darwinian aspect of the model then comes into play to shift the education curve 
upwards, since the quality types are assumed to enjoy an evolutionary advantage 
during the Malthusian regime, having more surviving children. In Figure 2C, there is 
now a unique globally stable steady state with a high rate of technological progress 
and a high level of education (g
H
, e
H
). 
 
 Galor and Moav do not offer much detail about the way in which human 
evolution occurs, but the approach has been taken up by Clark (2007), who argues 
that the Industrial Revolution occurred in Britain as the result of an evolutionary 
process improving the quality of the British population. There are, however, some 
obvious problems with the argument. First, the time scale being considered here is 
rather short for human evolution, which is normally seen as occurring over millennia 
rather than decades or even centuries. Second, the marriage of Darwinian and 
Malthusian elements is distinctly uneasy, because the Darwinian approach requires 
the group with the more successful strategy to increase its share of the population, 
while the dominant strategy is to have fewer children who are better educated. The 
Malthusian worry has always been the growing share of the uneducated masses. 
Although Galor and Moav accept this for the post-demographic transition period, they 
retain the assumption of an evolutionary advantage to quality types during the 
Malthusian era. Third, this assumption rests on the slender empirical basis of a single 
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study by Clark and Hamilton (2006), which examined a sample of 2,250 English wills 
for the period 1585-1638 and found a positive association between wealth (and hence 
literacy) and the number of surviving children. Fourth, if behavioural traits such as 
hard work and time preference are passed on socially through families and wider 
society rather than bred into the genetic make-up, unified evolutionary growth theory 
becomes difficult to distinguish from the institutional approach, which Clark is so 
keen to disparage. 
 
3. Institutions, markets and technology 
There has been much theoretical work on the institutional changes which underpinned 
the economic development of Europe from the middle ages, with North (1990) 
establishing the general framework. We will examine here the specific contribution of 
Greif (2000), who adopts a more formal; approach, using the game of trust or one-
sided prisoner‟s dilemma to analyse what he calls the fundamental problem of 
exchange (FPOE): how can you be sure that the other side to a bargain will fulfil their 
contractual obligations? The game is set out in Figure 3. Player I chooses either to 
initiate a trade (exchange) or not to initiate the trade (don‟t exchange). If he plays 
“don‟t exchange” then no trade occurs and both agents receive pay-off 0, denoted (0, 
0). If player I does initiate trade by choosing “exchange”, then player II must decide 
whether to cooperate (player II plays “exchange-cooperate) or to renege, for example, 
by running off with the goods that player I has offered, giving nothing in return. 
Assume that if there is cooperation then gains from trade are given by γ>0, shared 
between the two players, so player I gets γ-W and player II gets W. This is the most 
satisfactory outcome, where both players gain. However, player II can do better by 
reneging and walking off with the goods; then player II gets α>W and player I faces a 
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loss, with a pay-off δ<0. Note that if player I initiates trade, it is individually rational 
for player II to renege. But player I can anticipate this response, and so should not 
initiate trade. This means that the gains from trade (γ) will not be realized, as in Third 
World countries today and Europe in the Dark Ages. How is it possible to get out of 
this situation? In theory, player II must be able to credibly commit to not reneging. In 
practice, medieval Europe developed institutions such as merchant guilds for 
mitigating the FPOE. Guilds were able to regulate relations between merchants and 
also to defend merchants against expropriation by the state. It should be noted that 
Greif (1994) analyses more sophisticated models to deal with games played over more 
than one period, but the focus remains on how institutions deter opportunistic 
behaviour.  
 
This work is very helpful in understanding the long build up to modern 
economic growth emphasised by economic historians such as Britnell and Campbell 
(1995), with the British industrial revolution having long roots in the 
commercialisation of the economy from the late middle ages. The emphasis here is on 
the development of private order institutions. Yet Greif (2006) also recognises the 
importance of state institutions, since the existence of an effective state can make the 
enforcement of property rights easier for individuals. Indeed, one strand in the 
literature which applies new institutional economics to economic development in 
history emphasises the importance of political developments such as the Dutch 
Revolt, which led to the de facto independence of the United Provinces from 1579, 
and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which established constitutional monarchy in 
Britain (North and Weingast, 1989). The fact that these two countries led the process 
of economic development in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
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respectively, is at least suggestive of a link between the institutions of government 
and economic growth. 
 
It is helpful also to apply the approach of institutional economics to the 
acceleration of technological progress during the industrial revolution. In the context 
of technological innovation, entrepreneurs can afford to devote resources to the search 
for new methods only if they can be sure that others will not “run off” with their 
innovations without paying. The institutional mechanism which solves this 
fundamental problem of innovation is the patent system. However, it is not simply a 
question of the introduction of a formal system. In terms of North‟s (1990) definition 
of institutions, it is also important that the formal rules are underpinned by informal 
rules that make the system work. As MacLeod (1988: 1, 10) notes, the formal start of 
the system may be dated to the 1624 Statute of Monopolies, which was an attempt to 
end the Crown‟s abuse of letters patent, or documents by which special privileges 
were given. The statute specifically exempted patents granted for new inventions from 
its general proscription. During the seventeenth century, however, only a small 
minority of inventors filed for patents, preferring other means such as secrecy, to 
protect their intellectual property. Despite the fact that there were no changes in the 
formal institutional framework between 1624 and 1835, the system nevertheless 
developed in the light of the experience of administrators and patentees. By the mid-
eighteenth century, MacLeod (1988: 1) suggests that the system had “developed its 
own momentum and promoted a first-strike mentality among its users: one neglected 
to patent at one‟s peril”.  
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The patent system plays an important role in the Schumpeterian growth model 
of Aghion and Howitt (1992; 1998), who endogenise the rate of technological 
progress through spending on research and development (R&D). The model is 
summarised in Figure 4, taken from Carlin and Soskice (2006). The Solow relation 
shows a negative steady state relationship between the rate of innovation (x) and the 
degree of capital intensity measured in efficiency units )ˆ(k . However, the Schumpeter 
relation shows a positive relationship between innovation and capital intensity, which 
reflects in turn a positive relationship between capital intensity and R&D spending. 
The initial equilibrium is at A. As well as depending on capital intensity, R&D 
spending is also affected by the security of property rights in innovation. The 
introduction of an effective patent system, as in Britain on the eve of the industrial 
revolution, can thus be seen as shifting the Schumpeter relation upwards, resulting in 
a new equilibrium at B with a higher rate of innovation. An increase in the savings 
rate at the same time would shift the Solow relationship upwards, thus offsetting the 
fall in capital per unit of efficiency labour. 
 
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN HISTORY 
1. Wages, population and human capital: northwest European exceptionalism 
Recent research has suggested that northwest Europe, particularly Britain and 
Holland, developed very differently from the rest of Europe from the late middle ages. 
Since the industrial revolution occurred here, it suggests that a full understanding of 
the take-off to modern economic growth requires a study cutting across the 
conventional time periods of economic history. This finding of the Little Divergence 
within Europe has followed from the recent development of comparing levels rather 
than simply growth rates of real wages in Europe. Although the necessary data have 
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been available since the pioneering work of the International Scientific Committee on 
Price History during the 1930s, the early work using the data on wages and prices 
tended to focus on the path of real wages in an individual country, or where 
comparisons were made, tended to focus on differences in the rate of change rather 
than differences in the level (Cole and Crandall, 1964; Braudel and Spooner, 1967; 
Phelps Brown and Hopkins, 1981). This really only changed with the work of van 
Zanden (1999) and Allen (2001), who made wage comparisons amongst many 
European countries for the period after 1500, focusing on levels. Broadberry and 
Gupta (2006) made wage level comparisons between Europe and Asia, while Pamuk 
(2007) has looked at the data back to 1300, crossing the period of the Black Death. 
 
 Real consumption wages of European unskilled building labourers for the 
period 1300-1850 are shown in Table 1, taking London in the period 1500-49 as the 
numeraire. The first point to note is that wages followed a similar pattern across the 
Black Death in the whole of Europe. Complete time series exist for comparatively few 
cities before 1500, but there is also scattered evidence for other cities. Taken together, 
the evidence supports the idea of a substantial rise in the real wage across the whole 
continent of Europe following the Black Death, which struck in the middle of the 
fourteenth century, wiping out between a third and a half of the population, when 
successive waves of the plague are cumulated (Herlihy, 1997). This episode of 
European economic history thus  appears to be consistent with the Malthusian model, 
with a strong negative relationship between real wages and population. In the first half 
of the fifteenth century, the real wage was quite uniform across the countries for 
which we have data, at about twice its pre-Black Death level.  
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 From the second half of the fifteenth century, however, Britain and Holland 
followed a very different path from the rest of Europe, maintaining real wages at the 
post-Black Death level and avoiding the collapse of real wages which occurred on the 
rest of the continent. Although Allen (2001) used the term Great Divergence to 
describe this process, the term is more usually reserved for the emerging gap in living 
standards between Europe and Asia (Pomeranz, 2000). As a result, the emerging gap 
in living standards between Britain and Holland and the rest of Europe has recently 
become known as the Little Divergence.  
 
 Broadberry and Gupta (2006) provide some real wage evidence of the Great 
Divergence between Europe and Asia, shown here in Table 2. The grain wage, 
obtained by dividing the silver wage with the silver price of grain, the most important 
consumption item, is the closest that we can get to the real consumption wage for 
India and China at this time. Table 2 suggests that real wages in north and south India 
and the Yangzi delta region of China were falling decisively behind those in Britain 
from the late seventeenth century, contrary to the revisionist claims of Pomeranz 
(2000), Parthasarathi (1998) and Frank (1998) that the richest parts of Asia remained 
at the same level of development as the richest parts of Europe until as late as 1800. 
From the late eighteenth century, it becomes possible to calculate the real 
consumption wage for China, and Allen et al. (2010) are able to show that the 
comparative Anglo-Chinese real consumption wage at this time was very close to the 
comparative Anglo-Chinese grain wage. Furthermore, the Anglo-Indian grain wage at 
this time was around the same magnitude, i.e. about one-third of the English level.  
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Returning to developments within Europe, a number of recent studies have 
moved beyond trends in real wages to reconstruct national income back to the late 
medieval period. For Britain and Holland, annual estimates of per capita GDP are 
available from the work of Broadberry et al. (2010) and van Zanden and van Leeuwen 
(2010), and are shown here in Figure 5. Holland forged ahead during its Golden Age 
between 1500 and 1650, while Britain caught up after 1650 and forged ahead during 
the Industrial Revolution of the early nineteenth century, although the precise details 
of the story of British overtaking are complicated by considerations of territory, since 
incomes were higher in England than in the rest of Britain and also higher in Holland 
than in the rest of the Netherlands. 
 
Table 3 adds data for other European countries to reveal the Little Divergence 
pattern in GDP per capita as well as in real wages. Per capita GDP trended 
downwards in Italy and Germany, and stagnated at a relatively low level in Sweden. 
In Spain, although there was a temporary growth spurt with the imperial expansion of 
the sixteenth century, the downward trend in living standards was soon resumed. 
 
 To what extent can the Little Divergence be explained simply in terms of 
demographic factors? The simplest Malthusian approach would suggest that the 
persistence of high real wages in Northwestern Europe was the result of demographic 
restraint. However, this is far from clear in the population data assembled here in 
Table 4, taken largely from Malanima (2009a). It must be stated at the outset that 
there is considerable uncertainty about the data particularly in the early years, with 
estimates of the population of England in 1300 ranging from less than 4 million to 
more than 6 million (Hatcher, 1977). Whatever the pre-Black Death peak population 
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in England, there does nevertheless seem to be agreement that the population was 
slow to recover. This is much less clear in the rest of northwest Europe, however, with 
population well above its 1300 level already by 1500 in Belgium (Flanders), and with 
population nearly twice its pre-Black Death level by this time in the Netherlands 
(Holland). 
 
De Moor and van Zanden (2010) try to relate the Little Divergence to 
differences in demographic and labour market behaviour. They argue that what Hajnal 
(1965) calls the European Marriage Pattern emerged in the North Sea region 
following the Black Death. The key component was the primacy of mutual agreement 
over parental authority in the choice of marriage partner. The fact that both partners 
had to consent to marriage increased the bargaining position of women, and this was 
underpinned by the system of inheritance and access to the labour market. Although 
women could inherit in southern Europe as well as in the northwest, the transfer 
occurred at the point of marriage in the south via the dowry, but upon the death of the 
woman‟s parents in the northwest. This made early marriage more attractive in the 
south, since it enabled a daughter to gain access to the dowry, but it also gave the 
parents power over the choice of partner because the value of the dowry was 
uncertain. Increasingly in northwest Europe, but only to a lesser extent in the rest of 
the continent, growing access to the labour market gave a woman the power to refuse 
to marry an unsuitable partner chosen by her parents. This growing access to the 
labour market by women seems to be linked to the important role of the pastoral 
sector in the mixed agriculture that was prevalent in northwest Europe, and where 
women had a comparative advantage (Voigtländer and Voth, 2010). In late medieval 
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England, for example, Broadberry et al. (2010) find the pastoral sector accounting for 
around two-thirds of value added in agriculture. 
 
There does seem to be some evidence in favour of the idea of fertility 
limitation holding back population growth in the case of early modern England. 
Indeed, Wrigley et al. (1997) paint a detailed quantitative picture of fertility control 
through late marriage, so that England cannot be characterised as being in a high-
pressure Malthusian equilibrium. Figure 6 shows clearly that during the seventeenth 
century, the mean age at first marriage for males varied between 27 and 28, falling 
below 27 for the first time during the decade 1730-39. By the 1830s, it had fallen 
below 25. For females, the mean age at first marriage rose as high as 26.3 in the 1710s 
before falling to 23.1 by the 1830s. It is worth noting that the increase in fertility 
which accompanied industrialisation in Britain was therefore not a general 
phenomenon, but rather depended on the earlier limitation of fertility through late 
marriage. This fertility limitation is also seen by Voigtländer and Voth (2006) as an 
important factor raising the probability of an industrial revolution in Britain. The case 
is more difficult to make for Holland, however, given the above-average increase in 
population over the period 1300-1500. 
 
 The sign of the relationship between real wages and population clearly 
changed from negative to positive between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 
the fourteenth century, the increase in the real wage was made possible only by a 
sharp Malthusian fall in population following the Black Death. By the time of the 
industrial revolution, by contrast, rapid population growth could be sustained together 
with a rising real wage. In the intervening period, however, it is not clear that the 
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European economy can really be characterised as in a Malthusian regime. Indeed, 
recent historical research using VAR analysis suggests that the English economy may 
have ceased to operate in a Malthusian way much earlier than was once thought. 
Nicolini (2007) finds that the positive check (a negative relationship between the real 
wage and the death rate) disappeared during the seventeenth century and the 
preventive check (a positive relationship between the real wage and the birth rate) 
disappeared before 1740. However, Crafts and Mills (2009) replace the Allen (2001) 
real wage date used by Nicolini with a new real wage series produced by Clark (2005) 
and draw even more radical conclusions. Indeed, at no point during the period 1541-
1871 were they able to find evidence of positive checks, while evidence of preventive 
checks could only be detected until 1640.  
 
 One important aspect of this new literature on the Little Divergence between 
Northwest Europe and the rest of the continent is the focus on the linkages between 
demographic behaviour and the performance of the economy. This is something 
which had fallen out of favour following the Princeton Project on the Decline of 
Fertility in Europe of the 1960s and 1970s, which rejected a significant role for 
economic and social factors in explaining the demographic transition in favour of a 
process of innovation and diffusion driven by attitudes and networks of 
communication (Coale and Watkins, 1986; Brown and Guinnane, 2007: 575). There 
then followed a period when demographic history and economic history pursued 
almost separate paths. This recent emphasis by economic historians on the links 
between demographic and economic developments can be seen as mirroring the 
exploration of the links between the industrial revolution and the demographic 
transition in unified growth theory. The approach has been strengthened by the 
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findings of Brown and Guinnane (2007) that the Princeton Project‟s rejection of a role 
for economic factors rests on an inappropriate statistical methodology. In particular, 
Brown and Guinnane are able to show for two important regions studied by the 
Princeton Project that economic factors were indeed statistically significant 
determinants of fertility if a lower level of aggregation is used, and if appropriate use 
is made of information on both levels and rates of change of variables. 
 
 Economic historians have also recently paid more attention to the role of 
human capital, a key variable in unified growth theory, but which had previously been 
neglected in most accounts of the industrial revolution. Again, however, the picture is 
more complex than suggested by the early unified growth models. The International 
Scientific Committee on price history collected vast amounts of data on skilled wage 
rates to complement the unskilled wage rate data presented in Table 1. This data has 
been used to calculate the skill premium in Table 5, measured as the ratio of the daily 
wage of skilled craftsmen to the daily wage of unskilled labourers. This provides a 
measure of the incentive to invest in human capital, which would be expected to rise 
at the time of the industrial revolution version of unified growth theory. However, 
there is little evidence to support this. Although the premium did increase in some 
countries around the time of the industrial revolution, it fell in others, and where the 
trend was upwards, there were earlier periods when the premium was as high, if not 
higher. After a more detailed investigation of the British case using a longer run of 
annual data, Clark (2005) concludes that at the time of the industrial revolution, the 
skill premium was substantially below its medieval peak of around 2. Galor (2005: 
205) acknowledges this point, but counters it with the suggestion that although the 
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demand for human capital was increasing, this was offset by an increase in the supply 
of human capital, in particular through the introduction of public education. 
 
 It is therefore necessary to look directly for evidence of an increase in the 
quantity of human capital at the time of the industrial revolution. For England, it is 
possible in Figure 7 to track developments in literacy, as measured by the proportion 
of the population who could sign their names. For the period after 1750, Schofield 
(1973) presents data on the proportion of males and females who could sign their 
names at marriage, while for the period before 1750 Houstan (1982) tracks the 
proportion of those able to sign court depositions in northern England. For males, the 
big rise in literacy occurred during the seventeenth century, followed by a pause 
during the industrial revolution period, before the drive to more or less universal 
literacy during the second half of the nineteenth century. For females, the data suggest 
a more or less continuous rise in literacy from a very low level in the mid-seventeenth 
century. The English case thus offers little support for viewing the industrial 
revolution as uniquely linked to developments in human capital. 
 
 Turning to the literacy data for a wider sample of largely west European 
countries circa 1800 in Table 6, however, notice again the Little Divergence pattern, 
with high levels of literacy in northwest Europe covering England and Scotland, the 
Netherlands and belgium, Germany west of the Stralsund-Dresden line and France 
north of the Geneva-St. Malo line. In most of these regions, already 60 to 80 per cent 
of the male population and over 40 per cent of the female population were literate. In 
more peripheral regions, literacy rates were much lower, between 10 and 45 per cent 
for males and 10 to 20 per cent for females (Reis, 2005). 
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 The relationship between real wages, population and human capital during the 
transition to modern economic growth is thus more complex than suggested by 
unified growth theory. First, there is evidence that the European economy had ceased 
to behave in a Malthusian fashion long before the industrial revolution. Although the 
persistence of a high real wage in England is associated with a slow recovery of the 
population to pre-Black Death levels, Belgium and the Netherlands maintained a high 
real wage despite a rapid recovery of population. Second, although the incentive to 
invest in human capital was higher in the medieval period, there was a substantial 
increase in literacy in northwest Europe during the early modern period. Third, 
however, the industrial revolution appears to have coincided with a pause in this 
process of human capital deepening. 
 
2. Institutions, markets and technology 
Kindleberger (1996) and Maddison (2001) are the latest in a long line of economic 
historians to chart the rise to modern economic growth in the west as a series of 
growth episodes based around success in long distance trade. Economic primacy is 
seen as passing from the Italian city states before 1500 to Portugal and Spain in the 
sixteenth century, then to the Low Countries in the seventeenth century before the 
industrial revolution led to the primacy of Britain from the late eighteenth century. 
This approach normally goes hand in hand with a stress on institutions. As in the 
theoretical section, it is useful to begin the survey of historical work in this area with 
private order institutions.  
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Many writers have pointed to the importance of financial and commercial 
innovations in underpinning the success of the leading economies. Many of the key 
commercial institutions of the western world can be seen as having their origins in the 
Italian city states of Venice and Florence, which played such an important role in the 
revival of long distance trade between Europe and the East from the eleventh century. 
Deposit banking grew out of money changing, while insurance, the legal form of he 
modern company and double entry book-keeping all grew up around shipping 
ventures (Lane, 1966; Mueller, 1997). Similarly, early modern Amsterdam is credited 
by Neal (1990) with a number of commercial innovations including the bill of 
exchange, transferable shares in the capital stock of corporations traded on secondary 
markets and perpetual annuities issued annually by government, free of risk of default 
(consolidated debt or consols).  
 
Any claim to be the originator of any such practices is always open to 
challenge, however. Hence another important strand in the literature which traces the 
origins of western economic success to institutional developments is the emphasis on 
the growing commercialisation of the economy (Britnell and Campbell, 1995). The 
growing commercialisation of the European economy can most easily be captured 
quantitatively in the share of the population living in urban areas, since towns were 
the centres of commerce. Table 7 provides data on the share of the population living 
in towns of at least 10,000 inhabitants. For Europe as a whole, the trend is 
unmistakeably upwards from 1400. Looking at regional trends, however, urbanisation 
is another variable which displays the Little Divergence pattern. In the late medieval 
period there were two main urban centres of commerce in north Italy and in the Low 
Countries. While urbanisation stalled in north Italy after 1500, there was a brief surge 
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in Portugal and to a lesser extent Spain during the sixteenth century, following the 
opening up of the new trade routes to Asia and the New World. However, the most 
dramatic growth of urbanisation in the early modern period occurred in the 
Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and in England during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as those countries displaced the Iberian powers 
in long distance trade and commercialised their domestic economies to an 
unprecedented extent.  
 
The extent of commercialisation and the spread of specialisation which 
accompanied it can also be captured in Table 8 by the declining share of the labour 
force engaged in agriculture. The link between commercialisation and the share of the 
labour force in agriculture is at least implicit in the historical literature on proto-
industrialisation following the work of Mendels (1972), who saw commercialisation 
leading to the development of industry in the countryside before the industrial 
revolution. It is also implicit in the work of Brenner (1982), who emphasises the 
contrast between England, where the peasantry was replaced by tenants and labourers 
who had to compete in the market, and the continent where peasants were able to 
cling to the land and preserve feudal property rights. By 1600, the release of labour 
from agriculture had proceeded further in the Netherlands than in the rest of Europe, 
as the Dutch economy relied increasingly on imports of basic agricultural products 
such as grain and paid for them with exports of higher value added products (de Vries 
and van der Woude, 1997). By 1700, the share of the labour force engaged in 
agriculture was even smaller in England, where a highly commercialised agriculture 
produced enough grain to feed the population without recourse to substantial imports 
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(Deane and Cole, 1967; Crafts, 1985). The share of the labour force in agriculture 
remained substantially higher  in the rest of Europe.  
 
Another strand of the literature which seeks to apply the insights of the new 
institutional economics to history emphasises the role of state institutions. For North 
and Weingast (1989), the Glorious Revolution is important in creating the climate for 
the transition to modern economic growth, by limiting the power of the crown to 
interfere in economic activity, thus solving the “fundamental problem of exchange”. 
A similar argument can be made for the Dutch Revolt of the late sixteenth century, 
which overthrew the system of Spanish rule and established constraints on the abuse 
of executive power. The argument has been generalised by Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2005), who emphasise the interaction between access to the Atlantic and 
constraints on executive power. They point out that the opening up of the new trade 
routes after 1500 did not benefit all economies with access to the Atlantic equally. In 
the countries which gained most (Britain and the Netherlands), there were sufficient 
constraints on the rulers to endure that they were unable to appropriate the bulk of the 
gains from trade. By contrast, in the Atlantic economies which failed most obviously 
to gain from the new opportunities, despite their early role in the discovery of the new 
trade routes (Spain and Portugal), rulers were sufficiently strong to exploit the 
opportunities themselves and prevent a strong merchant class from constraining their 
powers to appropriate. 
 
As Mokyr (2008) notes, the literature on institutions has tended to say very 
little about the central feature of the industrial revolution, the dramatic technological 
change which occurred in Britain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
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One obvious institutional change which could provide such a link is the patent system, 
which until very recently has received surprisingly little attention in mainstream 
economic history. The modern literature really began with the study of the English 
patent system during the industrial revolution by Dutton (1984) and Sullivan (1989), 
who highlighted the surge in patents from the middle of the eighteenth century, shown 
here in Figure 8, and saw it as a causal factor. MacLeod (1988) examined the 
evolution of the system from the mid-seventeenth to the end of the eighteenth century, 
but emphasised its shortcomings as much as its advantages. However, there is a world 
of difference between saying that the patent system was not as good as it would later 
become, and dismissing its importance at the time.  
 
More recently, the importance of the role of the patent system in the 
acceleration of British economic growth has been emphasised by Broadberry and 
Gupta (2009) in the context of cotton textiles, where there was a dramatic shift of 
competitive advantage between Britain and India. Broadberry and Gupta (2009) 
emphasise the interaction between the large Anglo-Indian wage gap noted earlier and 
the institutional feature of the British patent system. High money wages in Britain 
meant that cotton textiles produced domestically with labour-intensive production 
methods could not compete with Indian goods in third markets, and could only be sold 
domestically because of protective measures that remained in force between 1701 and 
1774 (Inikori, 2002: 428-432; O‟Brien et al., 1991). This stimulated a two-stage 
process of technological change. First, high wages led to the adoption of a more 
capital intensive technology in Britain, characterised by the use of labour-saving 
machinery in factories. Second, this resulted in a faster rate of productivity growth in 
Britain, because of the greater incentive to devote resources to improving technology 
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where capital intensity is higher. This is consistent with the positive relationship 
between capital intensity, resources devoted to research and development, and the rate 
of technological progress, highlighted in Schumpeterian models of growth (Aghion 
and Howitt, 1998). This effect can be explained partly by the greater learning 
potential on capital intensive technology, as suggested by Arrow (1962), but in Britain 
the effect was amplified by the existence of an effective patent system.  
 
Note, however, that the argument is contingent on particular historical 
circumstances surrounding economic relations between Britain and India. The process 
of import substitution was started by the popularity of cotton cloth imported into 
Britain and the opportunity given to the early British cotton industry by the protective 
Calico Acts in force between 1701 and 1774 (Berg, 2002; Inikori, 2002: 428-432; 
O‟Brien et al., 1991). As productivity increased in the machine-intensive British 
cotton textile industry and stagnated in India, a shift in competitive advantage 
occurred. However, the shift in competitive advantage was delayed in international 
markets during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by a temporary rise 
in raw cotton prices in Britain, as the increase in production put pressure on factor 
markets. The shift in competitiveness in the Indian market was delayed further by 
transport costs, which prevented the British from breaking into the Indian market on a 
large scale until after 1830 (Ellison, 1886: 63; Twomey, 1983).  
 
 Now consider the implications of this approach for the question of why the 
key technological breakthroughs in cotton textiles occurred first in Britain. When 
Crafts (1977) posed this question, the obvious comparator country was France, which 
was being portrayed in revisionist work as having similar development potential 
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(O‟Brien and Keyder, 1978). However, the revisionism now seems to have been 
overdone, and in the recent literature on comparative levels of development, France 
emerges as a relatively low-wage economy in the eighteenth century (Allen, 2001). 
The other high-wage European economy was the Dutch Republic, and it is therefore 
interesting now to restate the question posed by Crafts (1977) as “Why Britain, not 
Holland?” rather than “Why Britain, not France?” The answer offered here is that 
while Holland had high wages like Britain, it lacked the large market to provide 
sufficient rewards for innovation. And while France had a large population to provide 
a large market, it lacked the high wages to stimulate the adoption of machine intensive 
technology which underpinned the process of technological change that occurred in 
Britain. 
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: COMBINING HISTORY AND THEORY 
In the introduction, I cited the comments of Schumpeter (1954) on the difficulties 
created by the existence of historical and theoretical temperaments. In this concluding 
section, I explore some of the implications of these difficulties, drawing on the 
examples of the previous sections. First, note that the unit of analysis is often quite 
different in the theoretical and historical literatures. Unified growth theory, in 
particular, seems to work best at the level of world development. Indeed, the basic 
Galor and Weil (2000) model works in terms of a single closed economy. Later work 
by Galor and Mountford (2007) does explore the Great Divergence within a two-
country model, but in a highly stylised way. Where country-specific data are used in 
Galor (2005), they are typically used for particular episodes and are presented only as 
suggestive evidence. Historians tend to worry much more systematically about the 
cross-sectional variation between countries and how it evolves over time, taking 
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delight in those details of the historical process referred to in the quote from 
Schumpeter (1954: 815) at the beginning of the paper. Historians need to be able to 
explain the Little Divergence and the differences between Britain and Holland, as well 
as the Great Divergence. For them, the cross-sectional variation is a crucial part of the 
story and models must be flexible enough to deal with it in a convincing way and not 
just as an ad hoc afterthought. 
 
 A second issue concerns the role of historical contingency. Again, unified 
growth theorists seem content to treat the industrial revolution as inevitable, with the 
general framework set up to deliver the transition to modern economic growth and the 
specifics of the model affecting only the timing. For historians, historical contingency 
plays a more central role, and things could easily have turned out differently. This 
point was emphasised by Crafts (1977), who questioned the assumption that because 
the first industrial revolution occurred first in Britain ex post, it must have been more 
likely there ex ante. The importance of historical contingency has since become firmly 
entrenched in the historical literature via the idea of path dependence, with the 
sequence of events affecting the final outcome, not just the path taken (David, 1985, 
Arthur, 1989). 
 
 The recent historical and theoretical literatures therefore share a common 
purpose in breaking away from the traditional practice of using different methods to 
analyse the world before and after the industrial revolution. However, there remain 
important differences. From the point of view of an economic historian, it is important 
that the theoretical framework should remain flexible enough to deal with the cross-
sectional variation and leave room for historical contingency. 
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FIGURE 1: Technological progress and education in the Galor-Weil model 
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C: Large population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Galor and Weil (2000: 818-820). 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Education and technological progress in the Galor-Moav model 
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B: Small fraction of quality types 
 
 
 
 
C: Large fraction of quality types 
 
 
Source: Galor and Moav (2002: 1163-1165). 
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FIGURE 3: The one-sided prisoner’s dilemma game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Greif (2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4: An increase in returns to innovation 
 
 
 
Source: Derived from Carlin and Soskice (2006: 544). 
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TABLE 1: Daily real consumption wages of European unskilled building labourers (London 1500-49 = 100) 
 
 1300-
49 
1350-
99 
1400-
49 
1450-
99 
1500-
49 
1550-
99 
1600-
49 
1650-
99 
1700-
49 
1750-
99 
1800-
49 
Northwestern Europe            
London 57 75 107 113 100 85 80 96 110 99 98 
Amsterdam     97 74 92 98 107 98 79 
Antwerp   101 109 98 88 93 88 92 88 82 
Paris     62 60 59 60 56 51 65 
Southern Europe            
Valencia   108 103 79 63 62 53 51 41 -- 
Madrid     -- 56 51 -- 58 42 -- 
Florence/Milan 44 87 107 77 62 53 57 51 47 35 26 
Naples     73 54 69 -- 88 50 33 
Central & eastern 
Europe 
           
Gdansk     78 50 69 72 73 61 40 
Warsaw     -- 75 66 72 45 64 82 
Krakow   92 73 67 74 65 67 58 63 40 
Vienna   115 101 88 60 61 63 61 50 27 
Leipzig     -- 34 35 57 53 44 53 
Augsburg     62 50 39 63 55 50 -- 
 
Source: Broadberry and Gupta (2006: 7); derived from the database underlying Allen (2001: 429). 
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TABLE 2: Grain wages of unskilled labourers in England, India and China, 
1550-1849 
 
A. Grain wages in England and India (kilograms of grain per day) 
 England  India  Indian wage as % 
Date (wheat)  (wheat) (rice, on wheat 
equivalent basis) 
 of English wage 
1550-99 6.3  5.2   83 
1600-49 4.0  3.8   95 
1650-99 5.4  4.3   80 
1700-49 8.0   3.2  40 
1750-99 7.0   2.3  33 
1800-49 8.6  2.5   29 
 
B. Grain wages in England and China (kilograms of grain per day) 
 England  Yangzi delta  Chinese wage as % 
Date (wheat)  (rice) (rice, on wheat 
equivalent basis) 
 of English wage 
1550-1649 5.2  3.0 4.5  87 
1750-1849 7.8  2.0 3.0  38 
 
Source: Broadberry and Gupta (2006: 17, 19). 
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FIGURE 5: British and Dutch real GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars 
 
 
 
Sources: Broadberry et al. (2010); van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2010). 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3: GDP per capita levels in 1990 international dollars 
 
 England/ 
GB 
Holland/ 
NL 
Belgium Italy Spain Germany Sweden 
1300 712   1,644    
1400 1,284 1,195  1,726    
1500 1,127 1,454 929 1,644 1,295 1,332  
1570 1,174 1,432 1,089 1,463   860 
1600 1,127 2,662 1,073 1,302 1,382 894  
1650 979 2,691 1,203 1,255  1,130  
1700 1,568 2,105 1,264 1,398 1,230 1,068  
 1,506       
1750 1,660 2,355 1,375 1,553 1,191 1,162  
1800 2,140 2,408 1,497 1,333 1,205 1,140 953 
  1,853      
1820 2,124 1,886 1,534 1,445   1,009 
1850 2,718 2,371 1,841 1,350 1,487 1,428 1,289 
 
Sources: England/Great Britain: Broadberry et al. (2010); Holland/Netherlands: van 
Zanden and van Leuwen (2010); Belgium: Buyst (2009); Blomme and van der Wee 
(1994); Italy: Malanima (2009b); Spain: Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 
(2009); Germany: Pfister (2009); Sweden: Krantz (2004); Krantz and Schön (2007). 
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TABLE 4: European population by country (millions) 
 
 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1750 1800 1870 
Scandinavia 1.8 1.4 1.5 2.4 2.9 3.6 5.2 13.3 
England (Wales) 4.7 2.1 2.2 4.1 5.2 5.9 8.6 21.2 
Scotland 1.0 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.6 3.4 
Ireland 1.4 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.9 3.1 5.2 5.8 
Netherlands 0.8 0.6 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.1 3.7 
Belgium 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.2 2.9 4.9 
France 16.0 12.0 15.0 18.5 21.5 24.6 29.0 38.0 
Italy 12.5 8.0 9.0 13.3 13.5 15.5 18.1 28.0 
Spain 5.5 4.5 5.0 6.8 7.4 9.3 10.5 16.2 
Portugal 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.0 2.6 2.9 4.3 
Switzerland 0.8 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.7 2.7 
Austria (Czech, Hung) 10.0 9.0 11.5 12.8 15.5 18.3 24.3 35.7 
Germany 13.0 8.0 9.0 16.2 14.1 17.5 24.5 41.0 
Poland 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 2.8 3.7 4.3 7.4 
Balkans 6.0 5.0 5.5 7.0 8.5 9.9 15.1 23.7 
Russia (European) 15.0 11.0 15.0 16.0 13.0 22.0 35.0 63.0 
EUROPE 93.1 67.1 81.7 107.0 114.7 142.7 191.0 312.3 
EUROPE (exc Russia) 78.1 56.1 66.70 91.0 101.7 120.7 156.0 249.8 
 
Sources: Data for England from Broadberry et al. (2010); other countries from 
Malanima (2009a). 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6: Mean age at first marriage, England (decennial data) 
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Source: Wrigley et al. (1997: 134). 
Note: Each observation refers to the decade beginning in the year indicated. Thus, for 
example, the 1610 observation refers to 1610-19. 
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TABLE 5: Skill premium (ratio of skilled wage to unskilled wage) 
 
 1500-
49 
1550-
99 
1600-
49 
1650-
99 
1700-
49 
1750-
99 
1800-
49 
Northwestern Europe        
London 1.56 1.50 1.59 1.49 1.40 1.55 1.63 
Southern England 1.68 1.50 1.49 1.50 1.49 1.52 1.51 
Amsterdam 1.45 1.49 1.44 1.40 1.31 1.29 1.32 
Antwerp 1.73 1.75 1.66 1.66 1.67 1.67 1.66 
Paris 1.57 1.64 1.61 1.59 1.61 1.79 1.66 
Southern Europe        
Valencia 1.55 1.29 1.19 1.49 1.51 1.49 -- 
Madrid -- 1.98 2.51 -- 2.27 2.02 2.06 
Milan -- -- 1.78 1.95 1.91 1.86 2.00 
Florence 1.83 1.97 2.26 -- -- -- -- 
Naples 2.06 1.57 1.47 -- 1.23 1.50 1.73 
Central & eastern 
Europe 
       
Gdansk 1.33 2.23 1.68 1.79 1.76 1.41 1.67 
Warsaw -- 1.44 1.75 1.59 2.79 2.18 2.22 
Krakow 2.0 1.79 1.24 1.41 1.50 1.31 2.17 
Vienna 1.48 1.50 1.25 1.49 1.50 1.60 1.52 
Leipzig -- 1.74 1.94 1.79 1.68 1.61 1.52 
Augsburg 1.67 1.35 1.35 1.38 1.43 1.26 -- 
 
Source: Derived from Broadberry and Gupta (2006: 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7: Literacy rates in England, 1640-1840  
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Sources: Houstan (1982); Schofield (1973). 
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TABLE 6: Literacy rates in Europe, circa 1800 
 
 Males Females All 
England 60 40  
Scotland 65 15  
Netherlands 73 51  
Belgium 60 37  
Germany    
Saxony 80 44  
Hesse 91 43  
France    
Northern France 71 44  
Southern France 44 17  
Norway   21 
Sweden   20-25 
Portugal   <20 
Italy    
Piedmonte   25 
Duchy of Parma 45 23  
Marche 17 6  
Hungary   6 
 
Source: Reis (2005: 202). 
 
 
 
TABLE 7: European urbanisation rates (%) 
 
 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1750 1800 1870 
Scandinavia -- -- 0.7 2.1 4.3 4.6 4.6 5.5 
England (Wales) 4.0 2.5 2.3 6.0 13.2 16.4 22.1 43.0 
Scotland -- -- 2.3 1.5 5.3 11.5 23.9 36.3 
Ireland 0.8 2.1 -- 1.0 5.1 5.1 7.3 14.2 
Netherlands -- -- 17.1 29.5 32.5 29.6 28.6 29.1 
Belgium 18.2 21.9 17.6 15.1 20.2 16.5 16.6 25.0 
France 5.2 4.7 5.0 6.3 8.7 8.7 8.9 18.1 
Italy CN 18.0 12.4 16.4 14.4 13.0 13.6 14.2 13.4 
Italy SI 9.4 3.3 12.7 18.6 16.1 19.4 21.0 26.4 
Spain 12.1 10.2 11.4 14.5 9.6 9.1 14.7 16.4 
Portugal 3.6 4.1 4.8 11.4 9.5 7.5 7.8 10.9 
Switzerland 3.0 2.0 2.8 2.7 3.3 4.6 3.7 8.2 
Austria (Czech, Hung) 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.6 1.7 2.6 3.1 7.7 
Germany 3.4 3.9 5.0 4.4 5.4 5.7 6.1 17.0 
Poland 1.0 1.3 5.4 6.6 3.8 3.4 4.1 7.8 
Balkans 5.2 4.6 7.7 13.3 14.0 12.3 9.8 10.6 
Russia (European) 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.5 3.6 6.7 
EUROPE 5.4 4.3 5.6 7.3 8.2 8.0 8.8 15.0 
 
Source: Malanima (2009a). 
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TABLE 8: Share of agriculture in the labour force (%) 
 
 
 England Netherlands Italy France Poland 
1300 -- -- 63.4 -- -- 
1400 60.8 -- 60.9 71.4 76.4 
1500 59.0 56.8 62.3 73.0 75.3 
1600 -- 48.7 60.4 67.8 67.4 
1700 33.4 41.6 58.8 63.2 63.2 
1750 31.8 42.1 58.9 61.1 59.3 
1800 26.4 40.7 57.8 59.2 56.2 
 
Source: Derived from Broadberry and van Leeuwen (2010); Allen (2000: 8-9). 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8: Patents issued in England, 1661-1851 
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Source: Derived from Sullivan (1989). 
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